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
being focused mainly on and astending, whereas or aparative hoodagy is followed in advancing true.


There are many di erent ways in which that's done. My interest has really been in mapping those di erent approaches to

OWENS: Can you distinguish comparative theology from other ways of doing theology and also from what's sometimes known as comparative religions?

cornille: That question is really on people's mind now because it is indeed a new field. People have been doing comparative theology for the past twenty years without always calling it compara

Insofar as it's theology, it's a normative discipline. In that regard, it's different from comparative religions, which, at least ideally or in terms of its goal, is a neutral or non-normative or purely social scientific approach to the study of religion. Comparative theology is a normative discipline, starting from a confessional perspective and then engaging the other traditions. Comparative religion is





There's also comparative theology that starts from the data of a particular religious tradition and tries to advance its self-understanding. While the first type wants to discover truth, the second type is more confessional; it wants to elucidate truth that is already given within a particular religious tradition.

this way.

I also distinguish the two types of doing comparative theology as being meta-confessional or confessional. When it's confessional, it starts from the normativity of a particular tradition. It recognizes the authority of established figures of hierarchy in matters of theology and so on, so it tries to do theology as everyone does it but with an openness to what might be learned from other religions.

OWENS: Are there people—scholars, practitioners—who identify as comparative theologians outside of the Christian tradition?

CORNILLE:

come out as areas in which women may have something distinctive to o er.

But again it was very interesting, at the conference: nobody wanted to put their foot down and say "this is what women can bring" or "this is a distinctive contribution of women," but at the same time everyone was sort of feeling around it and still sort of o ering, by way of examples, ways in which women have really been very instrumental in dialogue.

OWENS: You've written important work on the concept of double or multiple religious belonging. This is something that stretches many faithful people's minds a bit. Can you say what you mean by that concept and what you don't mean by it?

CORNILLE: It's a category that started to come into academic discourse and dialogue mostly in the early 2000s. (I actually published a book that I think is partly guilty of spreading that word around.) What we see in the past ten to fifteen years is more and more people who claim to be, in particular, Christian and Buddhist. There are also JewBus—people who are Jewish and Buddhist-and more limited a liations between Christians who claim also to be Hindu.

What's interesting is that, in the 1960s, people didn't want to belong to any religion. Now they want to claim that they actually belong to more than one tradition. That's an interesting shift, I think, that may be reflective of a greater sort of respect for religious identity and belonging in the past 15 years.

It's easy, of course, to say that you identify with or belong to di erent religious traditions. I see my work as sort of a critical reflection on the possibility and limits of multiple-religious belonging. I love patterns and ideal types and classifications, so what I try to do first is show how many di erent types of multiple-belonging there are.

There are also a lot of people who belong to di erent religions not out of their own will—involuntary multiple-belonging versus voluntary multiple-belonging. If you happen to be born in a family where your parents are from di erent religions, you will somewhat belong to each. Or if you're born in a culture where the religion is shaped by di erent religions, you will somewhat belong to many.

The more problematic, or challenging, situation is one where people voluntarily belong to more than one religion. This is something that has happened throughout history. When people are sick, they go and find solace wherever it's o ered. In Japan, for example, people may be Buddhist primarily or Christian, but when they're sick they go to a new religion that o ers miraculous healing. That also goes on in Africa, where Christians go to Muslim faith healers; or in India, where Muslims go to Hindu temples that have goddesses who can promise all kind of goods. That's usually a temporary multiple-belonging.

But some people say that they fully belong to Christianity and Buddhism. This, I think, is a much more problematic situation. But those who make such claims are adamant about it. I try to point to the problems—theological or practical—of that reality and also try to

advance another theory for why religions might have the ideal of single belonging. Now we're sort of in a culture where any claim to absoluteness or any claim to absolute control or belonging is seen as sort of exclusive and jealous, but I also have tried to show that there might be sort of deeper spiritual reasons for a single religious identity or belonging.

My latest work in that regard is developing di erent ways of negotiation of multiple belonging, so people who claim to belong to more than one religion have di erent ways of rationalizing this or claiming that it's possible. I've tried to map out how that's done.

OWENS: How, if at all, does this—what you described as kind of a growing group of people who are identifying with multiple traditions—map on to the simultaneous sort of rise of what is called the American "nones"—the una liated in the United States? Are these some of the